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INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry is the poster child for a strong patent
system.' Drug companies bear the high costs of obtaining approval from
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) only because they can then
charge high prices for patented drugs without fear of generic competi-
tion.2 As described by Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, drugs are
also special because of the low number of patents per product: "In some
industries, such as chemistry and pharmaceuticals, a single patent nor-
mally covers a single product. Much conventional wisdom in the patent
system is built on the unstated assumption of such a one-to-one corre-
spondence."' Although many have repeated this one-patent, one-drug
assumption,4 there has been little empirical analysis of how many patents
actually protect each drug.
In fact, most small-molecule drugs are protected by multiple patents.
The average was nearly 3.5 patents per drug in 2005, with over five pat-
ents per drug for the best-selling pharmaceuticals; these numbers have
5increased over time. This Note contains a detailed empirical examina-
tion of how many patents cover FDA-approved small-molecule drugs,
I. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 316 (2003) ("[T]he strongest case for patents in
something like their present form is said to be found in a subset of the drug industry."); Amy
Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for
University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1044-45 (2005) ("Many who accept
these premises [that strong patents reduce innovation and welfare] nonetheless consider the
pharmaceutical sector an exception.").
2. Alternative funding for pharmaceutical innovation, such as prize systems, may lead
to better health outcomes. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 1, at 1045 & nn.57-58. Currently,
however, patents are the main mechanism to promote drug innovation.
3. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1590 (2003).
4. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without
Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 445, 445 (2007) ("In some fields, like pharmaceuticals, the [patent-to-
product] ratio is close to one (one patent covers one product)."); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things
To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 150 (2007)
("[G]enerally, one patent covers one drug."); George A. Vinyard, Address at the Michigan
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review Symposium: Law, Policy and the Conver-
gence of Telecommunications and Computer Technologies (Mar. 9, 2001), available at http://
www.mttlr.org/html/symposia/convergence/wireless.html ("A lot of patent thinking appears to
be based on a fairly simple commercial model, like pharmaceuticals where there's one patent,
one product, one-to-one coverage, that's it.").
5. Small-molecule drugs have relatively simple chemical structures and are regulated
under the Hatch-Waxman Act, which requires pharmaceutical companies to list the patents
that cover each drug. See infra Part L.B. There is no similar patent data for more complicated
biologic drugs, but pharmaceutical companies will soon be required to provide this data under
the recent healthcare reform bill. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, § 7002, 124 Stat. 119, 811 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of42 U.S.C.).
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what factors influence the number of patents, and the implications of
having multiple patents on a drug.6
In particular, "follow-on" patents have important implications for the
growing number of universities and other public-sector research institu-
tions that want to make their patented medical technologies accessible in
developing countries.' For example, if a university chooses not to patent
a new drug molecule in India but subsequently licenses its U.S. patent on
that molecule to a pharmaceutical company that files a follow-on
method-of-treatment patent in India, then Indian generic manufacturers
will be unable to produce the drug." These results are important for the
ongoing debate about public-sector patenting.! The widespread preva-
lence of follow-on patents also has implications beyond the university
context, since these patents generally extend the patent life of a drug.
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I examines the role of pat-
ents in drug development and the regulatory environment under the
Hatch-Waxman Act. Part II discusses ways in which follow-on patents
can impede socially responsible licensing efforts by universities and
other public-sector institutions. Part III presents an empirical analysis
of drug patent data, which shows that the number of patents per drug has
increased over time, and examines factors that have influenced this trend.
The data also reveal that drugs with public-sector patents are more likely
to have follow-on patents than drugs without public-sector patents. How-
ever, because many of these follow-on patents are additional public-sector
patents, the drugs with public-sector patents are actually less likely to have
private-sector follow-on patents. Finally, Part IV describes a table of de-
tailed patent information for eighteen recently approved drugs with both
public- and private-sector patents and discusses the implications of these
results for university patenting and licensing. Over half of public-sector
drugs still have private-sector patents, so public-sector institutions that
want their drugs to be generically produced for patients in developing
countries will need to request licensing terms that prevent private-sector
patents from blocking patient access.
6. This Note is the first to provide this detailed empirical analysis, but others have
noted that the one-patent, one-drug assumption does not reflect reality. See FED. TRADE
COMM'N, GENERic DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 39-40
(2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (noting that brand-
name companies are sometimes suing over three or more patents for high-earning drugs); C.
Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Generic Drug Challenges Prior to Patent Expiration 14
(Mar. 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (finding that the number of
patents per drug has been increasing over time).
7. For the purposes of this Note, a "follow-on patent" is defined as any patent beyond
the initial patent on a drug. For example, a drug with three patents has two follow-on patents.
A "public-sector" institution is a university, institute, hospital, or government.
8. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 1, at 1084 & n.253.
9. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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I. THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN DRUG DEVELOPMENT
A. Patents and the Economics of Drug Development
Bringing a new drug to market is expensive. The pharmaceutical in-
dustry group, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA), claims that the research and development (R&D)
cost per approved drug was $1.3 billion in 2005,'o up from $802 million
in 2001." The accuracy of this industry-funded research is highly con-
tested.12 Whether the exact figure is $100 million or $1 billion, however,
it is clear that the cost of research and testing is very high.
After one pharmaceutical company has undertaken the expense of
discovering a drug and proving its efficacy and safety through clinical
trials, it is comparatively inexpensive for a generic company to enter the
market; one estimate placed the entry cost in the 1990s at $603,000."
Because of the high ratio of R&D costs to imitation costs, there would
be little incentive for innovator pharmaceutical companies to develop
new drugs in the absence of effective legal protection against imitators. 4
The patent system provides one such form of protection.
10. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE, at
inside front cover (2010) (citing Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Bio-
pharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469
(2007)), available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/phrma.org/files/attachments/Profile_2010
FINAL.pdf.
I1. Id. (citing Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price
of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003)).
12. See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How
THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 37-46 (2004) (suggesting that the actual
average development cost is under $100 million); Richard G. Frank, Editorial, New Estimates
of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH EcoN. 325, 325 (2003) (stating that the $802 mil-
lion estimates "have been a matter of heated debate since they were first made public in
2001"); Donald W. Light, Misleading Congress About Drug Development, 32 J. HEALTH POL.
PoL'Y & L. 895, 897-900 (2008) (reviewing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVEL-
OPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (2006)) (criticizing DiMasi. Hansen, and
Grabowski's sample as "nonrandom and small" and "unverifiable industry data," and arguing
that their estimate of development costs may be off by a factor of ten); Donald W. Light, Re-
ply to DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 325 (2008) (rebutting
DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski's criticisms of Light's criticisms of their work); F.M.
Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry-Prices and Progress, 351 NEw ENG. J. MED. 927,
928 (2004) (noting that the $802 million estimate "must be regarded with caution" because the
sample came from only ten companies, "[o]nly about half the estimated price tag entailed
actual out-of-pocket costs," and the sample "placed a disproportionate emphasis on drugs for
chronic diseases, which require extensive testing to identify long-term effects").
13. David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 37, 47 (2005).
14. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 3, at 1616-17.
15. Patents are not the only way to provide incentives for new medical technologies;
recent proposals advocate de-linking research and development costs from manufacturing
costs by rewarding a new innovation based on its health impact. See Medical Innovation Prize
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Empirical studies have repeatedly found that while patents are sur-
prisingly unimportant for appropriating returns on R&D in most
industries, they are very important in the pharmaceutical industry. One
study of 100 randomly selected firms found that patents were "essential
for the development or introduction of 30 percent or more of the inven-
tions in only two industries-pharmaceuticals and chemicals."'" Based
on 650 completed questionnaires from industrial research managers,
Levin and his colleagues found that "[i]n only one industry, drugs, were
product patents regarded by a majority of respondents as strictly more
effective than other means of appropriation," and they described phar-
maceuticals as "one of the few [industries] in which patents really do
seem to matter." 7 In a later survey of R&D managers with 1478 respon-
dents, Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh similarly found that the pharmaceutical
industry was one of the few places "where patents are effective."
Although these surveys are over ten years old,'9 the importance of
patents to the pharmaceutical industry has not abated.20 Pharmaceutical
companies spend more money on lobbying than any other industry-
over $200 million in 2007-much of which is devoted to maintaining a
strong patent system.2' Part of this effort is focused on general patent
Act of 2007, S. 2210, 1 10th Cong. (2007); AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH
IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL (2008), available at
http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/igh/; Barbados, Bolivia, Suriname & Bangladesh, A Prize
Fund To Support Innovation and Access for Donor Supported Markets (Apr. 15, 2009),
http://www.who.int/phi/Bangladesh-BarbadosBoliviaSurinameDonorPrize.pdf.
16. Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SC. 173,
174 (1986).
17. Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 796, 824.
18. Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellec-
tual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)
23, 32 tbl.1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf. Cohen and his colleagues also found that "in no in-
dustry are patents identified as the most effective appropriability mechanism"-other methods
like secrecy and lead time are more important. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
19. Although there are no more recent surveys that include the pharmaceutical industry,
the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey of 1332 high technology start-up companies provides some
"nuanced and multi-faceted" results on the utility of patents for entrepreneurs. See Stuart J.H.
Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High Technology Entrepre-
neurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1255, 1262 (2010).
20. See Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2195
(2009) (noting that the comparative value of each patent is much higher in the life sciences
than in engineering fields and that patents are not important for technology transfer in most
fields other than pharmaceuticals and biotechnology).
21. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System,
87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1353, 1359-61 (2009).
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reform, 22 but pharmaceutical manufacturers also operate within a com-
plex regulatory environment under the FDA, which "blur[s] the
functional distinction between drug regulation and patents."23 This legis-
lative regime is described in the following section.
B. FDA Regulation of Drug Patents and the Hatch- Waxman Act
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 198424 is a legislative compromise be-
tween large brand-name companies, who disliked losing part of their
patent term to long FDA approval periods, and generic companies, who
disliked having to re-prove the safety and efficacy of drugs that were
already on the market.' The resulting regulatory regime confers some
additional market protections for new drugs.
Under the Hatch-Waxman regime, a brand-name company seeking
26FDA approval for a new drug must file a new drug application (NDA).
In addition to detailed information about the properties of the drug, the
application must include "the patent number and the expiration date of
any patent which claims the drug . . . or which claims a method of using
such drug and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could
reasonably be asserted," and this information must be amended as new
patents are issued.27 After the drug is approved, the FDA must make this
list public. 28 The FDA publication containing new drug information is
known as the Orange Book, and it may be searched freely online.29
The FDA is not required to review patents before listing them,o
which has led to concerns about abuse of the Orange Book by brand-
name pharmaceutical companies. Professor Rebecca Eisenberg has
summarized the process of "evergreening" drug patents:
22. See, e.g., Press Release, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., PhRMA Statement on
Patent Reform Act of 2009 (Mar. 3, 2009), available at http://www.phrma.org/news-room/
press.releases/phrma statement.on.patent reformact-of_2009 ("[Tihe bill would reduce
the value of the patents that are the lifeblood of America's innovative business sectors, which
depend on intellectual property protection.").
23. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELE-
COMM. TECH. L. REV. 345, 357 (2007).
24. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 21, and 35
U.S.C.).
25. In addition to the needless expense, there are ethical problems with giving sick
patients a placebo when the efficacy of the test drug is already proven.
26. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2009).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); accord 21 C.F.R. § 314.53 (providing more details about
which patents must be submitted).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(e).
29. OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, FDA, ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS
WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (30th ed. 2010) [hereinafter ORANGE
BooK], available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm.
30. Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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In recent years drug innovators have sought to prolong their ef-
fective periods of patent protection through various
"evergreening" strategies that add new patents to their quivers as
old ones expire. Examples include patents on "metabolites" (i.e.,
the products into which drugs are transformed in a patient's
body); patents on intermediate products used in producing
drugs; patents on new uses for drugs; and patents on new formu-
lations or preparations. Some innovating firms have succeeded
in getting such patents issued by the PTO, and in using them to
defer FDA approval of generic products for years pending reso-
lution of patent infringement claims. The industry's track record
in actually winning these infringement claims, however, has
31been considerably worse ....
In particular, commentators have suggested that many of these follow-on
patents may be rendered obvious in light of KSR v. Teleflex.32
Once the FDA has approved an NDA, a generic company may then
seek FDA approval using an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA),
in which it must show that the generic is "bioequivalent to the listed
drug."" It does not need to re-prove the safety and efficacy of the drug.
The generic company also must provide a certification for each patent
listed in the Orange Book." If the company seeks FDA approval prior to
patent expiration, it files a "paragraph IV" certification, claiming that
"such patent is invalid or will not be infringed."35 The first generic com-
pany to receive FDA approval after a paragraph IV certification receives
180 days of market exclusivity," providing a significant incentive for
generic companies to challenge patents.
The brand-name company may then file a patent infringement suit
within forty-five days, which provides a thirty-month stay before the
FDA will approve the generic, effectively giving the brand-name
31. Eisenberg, supra note 23. at 354 (footnotes omitted). For a primer on how to use
patent filings to extend the patent life of a drug, see Tamsen Valoir, Six Methods of Preserving
Market Exclusivity, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Nov. 2006, at 12, 14.
32. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (finding a car pedal design
obvious and rejecting the Federal Circuit's "rigid approach" to obviousness in favor of "an
expansive and flexible" approach); see, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma's Nonobvious
Problem, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 375, 423 (2008) ("The practical effect [of the Federal
Circuit's post-KSR cases] is to make it more difficult to obtain evergreening patents on new
versions of successful products . . . ."); Michael Enzo Furrow, Pharmaceutical Patent Life-
Cycle Management After KSR v. Teleflex, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 275, 277 (2008) ("[Tjhe
post-KSR non-obviousness standard will likely excise some 'secondary' pharmaceutical in-
ventions from the realm of patentability.").
33. 21 U.S.C. § 355j)(2)(A)(iv); accord 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(7).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV); accord 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(i)(A)(4).
36. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c).
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company an additional form of exclusivity.3 7 Under the original 1984
provision, brand-name companies could obtain multiple thirty-month
stays, which led to concerns about abuse. For example, a Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) report noted eight instances in which brand-name
companies listed additional Orange Book patents after an ANDA was
filed, many of which "do not appear to claim the approved drug product
or an approved use of the drug."" This provision was limited to one
thirty-month stay in 2003, first by executive action and then as part of
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003.'9
Another form of exclusivity granted by the Hatch-Waxman Act is
data exclusivity. This prevents generic companies from submitting an
ANDA within five years of the approval of a drug, "no active ingredient
(including any ester or salt of the active ingredient) of which has been
approved in any other application," and for three years after approval of
a drug "if such application contains reports of new clinical investiga-
tions."40
Finally, the Hatch-Waxman Act also allows pharmaceutical compa-
nies to obtain a patent term extension to extend the life of one patent
listed in the Orange Book by up to five years.4 1 Only one patent per drug
may be extended,42 and extensions are granted only for "the first permit-
ted commercial marketing or use of the product," meaning that a patent
owner cannot extend a patent on a drug that is merely a new formulation
of an old "product."" A patent term extension is not automatic; the patent
owner must apply for it in accordance with a set of detailed rules.45
II. FOLLOW-ON PATENTS AND SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE LICENSING
While follow-on patents can delay generic entry, they have even
more important implications for drugs arising from public research. As
37. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3). The FDA may approve the
drug sooner if the court happens to reach a final decision on the patents at issue before the
thirty-month stay expires. 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3)(ii).
38. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 6, at 40.
39. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 1101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2448-57; see also Eisenberg, supra note 23. at 358 n.54,
366 n.88.
40. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii)-(iii), (j)(5)(F)(ii)-(iv); accord21 C.F.R. § 314.108.
41. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006). A patent can only be extended if it has not expired and if it
has not previously been extended. Id. § 156(a)(l)-(2).
42. Id. § 156(b).
43. Id. § 156(a)(5).
44. The meaning of "product" is disputed. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
45. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(3), (d)(1)-(4) (listing application deadlines and required
contents).
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described in this Part, many universities and public-sector institutions
have important drug patents, but efforts to license these patents to pro-
mote the public interest can be derailed by private-sector follow-on
patents.
Since the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,46 universities and other recipients
of federal funds have been able to patent and exclusively license their
discoveries "to promote the utilization of inventions arising from feder-
ally supported research."47 Federally funded medical research had long
provided the foundations for many new drugs without needing patents to
create incentives for these innovations. 48 However, the Bayh-Dole Act
has resulted in direct institutional ownership of parts of the intellectual
property that protects many new drugs.49
To justify granting these private patent rights for government-
sponsored inventions, one cannot use the typical innovation incentive of
patents, because academic researchers have been innovating long before
the Bayh-Dole Act and are primarily motivated by a desire for prestige.so
Instead, Bayh-Dole patents typically are justified under commercializa-
tion theory-the idea that companies need exclusive patent rights to
bring an invention to market."' Commercialization theory is not appro-
priate for many industries,52 but exclusive rights may be needed in the
pharmaceutical industry because of the high cost of FDA approval and
low cost of imitation."
Still, granting exclusive patent rights may lead to monopoly pricing
and the resulting inefficiencies, depending on the availability of
46. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006).
47. Id. § 200. Other access-oriented goals of the Bayh-Dole Act include "promot[ing]
free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research" and "pro-
motling] the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United
States." Id. (emphasis added); cf Kesan, supra note 20, at 2176-77 (discussing conflicting
views of the purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act).
48. See, e.g., Richard B. Thompson, Foundations for Blockbuster Drugs in Federally
Sponsored Research, 15 FASEB J. 1671 (2001) (discussing the federally funded research
foundations for Zocor, Pravachol, and Lipitor, none of which have patents from public-sector
institutions).
49. See Bhaven N. Sampat, Academic Patents and Access to Medicines in Developing
Countries, 99 AM. J. PUs. HEALTH 9, 11-14 (2009) (describing seventy-two drugs with pat-
ents owned by thirty-five public-sector institutions).
50. See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 621 (2008); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellec-
tual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77, 92 (1999).
51. See Lemley, supra note 50, at 621; Rai, supra note 50, at 97-99.
52. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Comment, Addressing the Green Patent Global
Deadlock Through Bayh-Dole Reform, 119 YALE L.J. 1727, 1731-32 (2010) (citing refer-
ences to show why commercialization theory is not appropriate for engineering fields and
arguing that universities should not be allowed to seek patents or exclusive licenses for most
green technologies).
53. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
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substitutes. 54 Furthermore, most university technology transfer officers-
who have different motivations from individual researchers-are not
focused on increasing public access to public-sector inventions.5 A recent
study found that "university technology transfer activities continue to be
predominately patent-centric and revenue-driven with a single-minded
focus on generating licensing income and obtaining reimbursement for
legal expenses."5 6 Current Bayh-Dole patenting and licensing practices
have thus been criticized for creating unnecessary increases in consumer
prices and for creating patent hold-ups and a patent "anticommons." 55
The access-oriented goals of the Bayh-Dole Act would be fulfilled
best if universities and other recipients of federal research grants only
granted exclusive patent licenses to the extent necessary for commer-
cialization.9 Scholars and advocates have urged public-sector institutions
to adopt more socially responsible patenting and licensing policies that
follow this principle of promoting access, particularly among those suf-
fering from global health inequalities.6 A small but growing number of
institutions are focusing on this goal, as discussed in the remainder of
this Part.
Developing countries bear a disproportionate fraction of the world's
disease burden. Millions of people die each year from preventable and
54. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 300.
55. See Ouellette, supra note 52, at 1733 & n.34.
56. Kesan, supra note 20, at 2169. Kesan notes that most university technology transfer
offices have failed to break even, so they are not particularly successful at this revenue focus.
See id. at 2180 & n.64.
57. See, e.g., Clifton Leaf, The Law of Unintended Consequences, FORTUNE, Sept. 19,
2005, at 250, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/
2005/09/19/8272884/index.htm.
58. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998); Lemley, supra note 50,
at 615-19; Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Bio-
medicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 289, 295-303 (2003); Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-
Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from the US Experience, 6 PLoS BIOLOGY
2078, 2080 (2008). The anticommons and hold-up problems both stem from transaction costs.
An anticommons is the result of patents on basic research impeding future research, and a
patent hold-up occurs when a patent-holder impedes development by demanding royalties.
59. For example, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has stated that for genomic
inventions, "grant recipients' responsibilities under the Bayh-Dole Act" include pursuing non-
exclusive licensing "[w]henever possible" and narrowly tailored exclusive licenses only when
necessary "with the goal of promoting [federally funded inventions'] utilization, commerciali-
zation, and public availability." Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions: Final
Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 18,413, 18,413-15 (Apr. 11, 2005).
60. See, e.g., Kapczynski et al., supra note 1; Beime Roose-Snyder & Megan K. Doyle,
The Global Health Licensing Program: A New Model for Humanitarian Licensing at the Uni-
versity Level, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 281 (2009); Andrew Gray, University Technology Transfer,
U. ALLIED FOR ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (Sept. 12, 2009, 17:07), http://essentialmedicine.org/
projects/university-technology-transfer.
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treatable diseases, in part due to the high cost of patented medicines.
Because pharmaceutical revenues from developing countries are small,6 2
socially responsible licensing advocates argue that the potential profits
63from those countries are not necessary to promote commercialization.
Universities could thus pursue a market-segmentation strategy, allowing
pharmaceutical companies to recoup their development costs in high-
income countries while allowing generic competition in low- and mid-
dle-income countries.
Universities are able to influence global health. For example, in
1990 Yale patented the use of the drug stavudine (d4T) to treat HIV and
granted an exclusive license to Bristol-Myers Squibb.m Under the trade
name Zerit, stavudine became a key drug for treating HIV. With a cost of
over $1600 per year, however, it was inaccessible to most patients in de-
veloping countries. M6decins Sans Frontibres (MSF) wanted to
distribute stavudine in South Africa. An Indian manufacturer offered to
supply the drug for $40 per year, but MSF was unable to accept because
Yale had patented stavudine in South Africa. With the help of Yale Law
students Amy Kapczynski (now a law professor) and Marco Simons,
MSF approached Yale, which began negotiating with Bristol-Myers
Squibb.6 After the issue was publicized in the New York Times,7 Bristol-
Myers Squibb announced that it would not enforce the stavudine patent
in South Africa and that it would sell Zerit in sub-Saharan Africa for $55
68per year.
Out of this student movement at Yale, the group Universities Allied
for Essential Medicines (UAEM) was formed to encourage universities
to consider global health inequalities when they initially patent and
61. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 1, at 1032: Roose-Snyder & Doyle, supra note
60, at 281.
62. See PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 10, at 51 tbl.9 (reporting that
for PhRMA members in 2008. Africa constituted 0.5% of sales, China constituted 0.9%, India
constituted 0.2%, and all of the Americas except the United States and Canada constituted
3.8%).
63. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 1, at 1088-89, 1098-1100; Roose-Snyder &
Doyle, supra note 60, at 285-98; UNIvs. ALLIED FOR ESSENTIAL MEDS., GLOBAL ACCESS
LICENSING FRAMEWORK 4-5 (2010), available at http://essentialmedicine.org/sites/default/
files/archive/Framework%20V2.doc.
64. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 1, at 1035.
65. See id. at 1032, 1034.
66. Daryl Lindsey, Amy and Goliath, SALON (May 1, 2001), http://www.salon.com/
news/feature/2001/05/01/aids.
67. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Yale Pressed To Help Cut Drug Costs in Africa, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001, at A3; William Prusoff, Op-Ed, The Scientist's Story, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
19, 2001, at Al9.
68. See, e.g., Kapczynski et al., supra note 1, at 1036; Lindsey, supra note 66.
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license new medicines." In response to this movement, the Association
of University Technology Managers (AUTM) and a number of universi-
ties have endorsed two licensing policy statements that address global
health.
In 2007, a group of eleven universities and the Association of
American Medical Colleges (AAMC) signed a statement-Nine Points
To Consider in Licensing University Technologies-describing licensing
practices to ensure that the "core values" of universities are "maintained
to the fullest extent possible in all technology transfer agreements."0 The
signatories believe that "[u]niversities have a social compact with soci-
ety" that gives them "a responsibility . . . to share the fruits" of their
inventions with "the world's poor."" The final suggestion states: "Uni-
versities should strive to construct licensing arrangements in ways that
ensure that these underprivileged populations [in developing countries
and other underserved populations] have low- or no-cost access to ade-
quate quantities of these medical innovations."72 This statement now has
seventy-four signatories, including AUTM.
More recently, AUTM, the NIH, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), and nineteen universities and hospitals have endorsed
the 2009 Statement of Principles and Strategies for the Equitable Dis-
semination of Medical Technologies (Statement of Principles and
Strategies).74 This policy statement argues that "[u]niversities have a fun-
damental role in fostering public health" and lists "strategies that
promote the availability of health-related technologies in developing
countries for essential medical care," including "not patenting in devel-
oping countries," "filing and abandoning patents," and "[e]arly
publication and wide dissemination of results" to create prior art that
would preclude patenting.9 UAEM praised this new policy but expressed
69. See History, U. ALLIED FOR ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, http://essentialmedicine.org/
about-us/history (last visited June 22, 2010).
70. CAL. INST. OF TECH. ET AL., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS To CONSIDER
IN LICENSING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 1 (2007), available at http://www.autm.net/Nine
Points toConsider.htm.
71. Id. at 8.
72. Id.
73. Endorse the Nine Points To Consider, Ass'N U. TECH. MANAGERS, http://www
.autm.net/source/NinePoints/ninepoints endorsement.cfm (last visited June 20, 2010).
74. Endorse the Statement of Principles and Strategies for the Equitable Dissemination
of Medical Technologies, Ass'N U. TECH. MANAGERS, http://www.autm.net/endorse (last
visited June 20, 2010). The full text of the statement is available on AUTM's website. Ass'N
OF UNiv. TECH. MANAGERS ET AL., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIES FOR THE
EQUITABLE DISSEMINATION OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES (2009), available at http://www
.autm.net/Content/NavigationMenuTechTransfer/GlobalHealth/statemen tofprincliples.pdf.
75. Ass'N OF UNIv. TECH. MANAGERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 1-2.
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concern that these strategies would be insufficient to ensure access if
pharmaceutical companies file follow-on patents:
Although the signatories ... have made the highly commendable
commitment that university intellectual property should not be-
come a barrier to patient access to essential health-related
technologies, the commitment [to access] will be meaningless
unless it allows patients to have access to the final end product.
To ensure access, universities must also ensure that their licen-
sees' intellectual property does not become such a barrier. If
universities do not adopt such pro-active measures, then a licen-
see may preclude access by filing follow-on product, process, or
use patents, utilizing trade secret protection, or exercising data
exclusivity. 6
There has been no empirical analysis, however, of how significant this
problem might be. How often do university drugs have follow-on pat-
ents, and are follow-on patents more or less likely on university drugs
than on drugs without public-sector contributions? The following Part
examines these questions.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT DATA
A. Data Sources and Summary Statistics
Professor Bhaven Sampat provided a dataset containing all patents
that have been listed in the FDA Orange Book for all 938 drugs approved
from 1988 to 2005, which he has used to study the ability of academic
patents to improve access to medicines. This dataset was merged with
publicly available data from the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) on patent assignees, which codes assignees as corporations, in-
dividuals, universities, institutes, or governments, and which indicates
whether they are U.S. or foreign entities.7" This data was also merged
with data about which drug patents have been extended under 35 U.S.C.
§ 156, which was obtained from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) website.
76. UNIvs. ALLIED FOR ESSENTIAL MEDS., UAEM's RESPONSE TO THE STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIES 3 (2010), available at http://essentialmedicine.org/archive/
uaems-reponse-sps.
77. See Sampat, supra note 49.
78. The files used were "assignee.dta" and "patassg.dta.zip." Downloads, NBER PAT.
DATA PROJECT, https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads (last visited
Mar. 1, 2010).
79. Patent Term Extensions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/
patents/resources/terms/I56.jsp (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). Each patent may only be extended
Fall 2010] 311
312 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 17:299
Summary statistics for the resulting dataset can be found in Table I
in the Appendix. Of the 938 drugs, 380 were new chemical entities
(NCEs). An NCE is a new molecule rather than, for instance, a new for-
mulation of a molecule that already has FDA approval. FDA regulations
define an NCE as "a drug that contains no active moiety that has been
approved by FDA in any other application submitted under [the Hatch-
Waxman Act]."o
Table I also shows that 228 of the 938 drugs received priority FDA
review. Priority review, which is distinct from "Accelerated Approval"
and "Fast Track Review,"' is available for a drug when "no satisfactory
alternative therapy exists" or if the drug is "a significant improvement
compared to marketed products."82 Priority review is not limited to
NCEs: 72 of the drugs receiving priority review were not NCEs, and 224
of the NCEs did not receive priority review.
Extended patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 156 covered 453 of
the 938 drugs. As discussed in Part I.B, one patent term extension of up
to five years is allowed on each "product" for its "first permitted com-
mercial marketing or use."8' The meaning of "drug product" has been
disputed; the Federal Circuit has rejected the USPTO's "active moiety"
interpretation-the same standard used for defining NCEs-in favor of a
more specific "active ingredient" standard, thus allowing extensions on
more drugs.M Although all NCEs should be eligible for a patent term ex-
tension if they meet the requirements, a 1994 study found that about
one-third of NCE developers from 1984 to 1992 did not file for exten-
sions."' In this Note's 1988 to 2005 sample, extended patents cover forty
once, but drugs covered by a patent that had been extended as part of an earlier NDA were
flagged as having an extended patent because they still received the benefit of this longer
protection.
80. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (2009). "Active moiety" is defined as "the molecule or ion,
excluding those appended portions of the molecule that cause the drug to be an ester, salt ...
or other noncovalent derivative . . . of the molecule, responsible for the physiological or
pharmacological action of the drug substance." Id.
81. For a concise summary of the FDA review programs, see SUSAN THAUL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERv., RS 22814, FDA FAST TRACK AND PRIORITY REVIEW PROGRAMS (2008),
available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22814.pdf.
82. OFFICE OF NEW DRUGS, FDA, MAPP 6020.3, REVIEW CLASSIFICATION POLICY:
PRIORITY (P) AND STANDARD (S) 2 (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/ManualofPoliciesProcedures/ucm82000.pdf.
83. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
84. See PhotoCure ASA v. Kappos, 603 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2010). For a
discussion of the difference between "active ingredient" and "active moiety" in this context,
see Erica J. Pascal. The Billion-Dollar Naming Game: How Ambiguities in Patent Term Ex-
tension Provisions Allow Companies To Add Billions of Dollars to the Bottom Line, 24
BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 547, 551-52 (2005).
85. Suzan Kucukarslan & Jacqueline Cole, Patent Extension Under the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1994, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 511, 522
(1994).
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percent of NCEs." Of the 453 drugs with extended patents, 269 were
NCEs, and 127 received priority approval.
Being an NCE, receiving priority approval, and having an extended
patent are all independent variables, and there are some drugs with all
possible combinations of these variables. There are 329 drugs that had
none of these properties; these drugs form the baseline for the regres-
sions discussed in Part III.B.
FIGURE 1
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....- Priority Approval - - Extended Patent
Figure I shows the number of FDA-approved drugs as a function of
time from 1988 through 2005. It also separately shows the number of
NCEs, drugs receiving priority approval, and drugs covered by extended
patents.
There was a peak of eighty-eight drugs in 1996. The cause of the
1996 peak-and subsequent decline-is disputed. Some have hypothe-
sized that the peak resulted from accelerated drug approval under the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 (PDUFA),"' but that this was
86. Note that this is higher than the percent of NCEs that received a patent term exten-
sion, since multiple drugs can receive the benefit of one extended patent.
87. Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
21 U.S.C.).
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"not a stable state for either the industry or the FDA."" An empirical ex-
amination of this hypothesis, however, concluded that the peak was not
due to PDUFA but that "[m]ore research is needed" to understand its
89
cause.
Professor Sampat's dataset also classified drugs by therapeutic class,
such as anti-infective agents or cardiovascular agents. There are fifteen
classes with more than three drugs in them, which were used as separate
controls for some of the regressions. These classes are listed in Table 1.
As the following section illustrates, different therapeutic groups often
have different numbers of patents.
The bottom of Table 1 shows that these 938 drugs have had 1946
unique patents listed in the Orange Book, some of which are listed for
multiple drugs. The vast majority of these patents (1824) have only pri-
vate-sector assignees (corporations or individuals); 108 patents have
only public-sector assignees (universities, institutes, hospitals, or gov-
ernments). There are also fourteen patents with mixed public- and
private-sector ownership. For example, one of the patents on the cancer
drug Gleevec is jointly assigned to the pharmaceutical company Novar-
tis, the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, and Oregon Health and Science
University.90
The following sections present some statistics, figures, and regres-
sions based on this dataset to help answer the question of how many
patents are used to protect the intellectual property for different types of
drugs.
B. Results: How Many Patents Does It Take To Make a Drug?
Figure 2 shows the number of drugs that have had different numbers
of patents listed in the Orange Book. Three hundred five drugs have had
just one patent, while one drug-Evista, NDA number 20815-has had
twenty-two patents listed. The average number of patents per drug is
2.97; the median number is two. Sixty-seven percent of drugs have more
than one patent. These numbers show that the one-patent, one-drug as-
sumption is generally inaccurate.9 '
88. E.g., Janice M. Reichert, Trends in Development and Approval Times for New
Therapeutics in the United States, 2 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 695, 701 (2003).
89. James B. Graham, Trends in U.S. Regulatory Approvals of Biopharmaceutical
Therapeutic Entities 63 (Apr. 5, 2005) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/ 721.1/30276/60847766.pdf.
90. U.S. Patent No. 6,958,335 (filed Oct. 26, 2001).
91. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 2
NUMBER OF DRUGS AS A FUNCTION OF PATENTS
LISTED IN THE FDA ORANGE BOOK
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The average number of patents for different types of drugs is listed
in the second column of Table 1. NCEs have slightly fewer patents than
average (2.88), while drugs with priority approval or extended patents
have more (3.41 and 3.10, respectively). The first column of Table 2
shows the coefficients from a regression in which the total number of
patents on a drug is explained based on these three variables; the coeffi-
cients are statistically significant at the five or one percent level. 92
The lower number of patents on NCEs may reflect the fact that these
drugs can often be protected by simply having a single patent on the new
molecule, whereas companies may actively seek additional patents on
new formulations or on the use of an old molecule for a new indication.
For example, the original NDA for the antiretroviral ZeritC had just one
patent assigned to Yale University, 94 but the new formulation
92. The significance level indicates the likelihood that the effect was observed as a
matter of chance if the null hypothesis is true. For an overview of statistical significance and
other basic statistical tools that was written for federal judges, see David H. Kaye & David A.
Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83 (2d ed. 2000).
93. NDA 20412 was approved in 1994. ORANGE BOOK, supra note 29 (search by appli-
cation number for "20412").
94. U.S. Patent No. 4,978,655 (filed Dec. 17, 1986).
315Fall 2010]
316 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 17:299
Zerit XR" listed both Yale's patent and a patent for a slow release of the
original molecule, which was assigned to Bristol-Myers Squibb.96 Simi-
larly, the original NDA 97 for the schizophrenia drug Abilify listed just
one patent for the new molecule, 98 while the new formulation of Abilify,
approved two years later,' listed the original patent plus one for an oral
solution of that molecule.joo
The higher number of patents on drugs with priority approval or ex-
tended patents may reflect the increased importance of these drugs to
pharmaceutical companies. If pharmaceutical companies predict higher
sales for a drug or are more concerned about generic competitors, they
may pursue a more aggressive patenting strategy. For example, the fifteen
best-selling drugs from 2002 to 2004 have an average of over five patents
per drug, higher than any of the individual categories in Table 1.o0
The number of patents for a given drug has also been increasing over
time, as noticed by Professors Hemphill and Sampat."2 Figure 3 shows
the average number of patents in the Orange Book as a function of the
year a drug was approved by the FDA. The number of patents per drug is
seen to increase from around 2.5 in the late 1980s to nearly 3.5 by 2005.
The straight line shows a linear fit to the data. The second column of
Table 2 shows that this increase over time is statistically significant.o3
This increase may be caused by increasingly aggressive patenting strate-
gies, such as evergreening, by the pharmaceutical companies."3" The
95. NDA 21453 was approved in 2002. ORANGE BOOK, supra note 29 (search by appli-
cation number for "21453").
96. U.S. Patent No. 7,135,465 (filed Mar. 29, 2001).
97. NDA 21436 was approved in 2002. ORANGE BOOK, supra note 29 (search by appli-
cation number for "21436").
98. U.S. Patent No. 5,006,528 (filed Oct. 20, 1989).
99. NDA 21713 was approved in 2004. ORANGE BOOK, supra note 29 (search by appli-
cation number for "21713").
100. U.S. Patent No. 6,977,257 (filed Apr. 24, 2002).
101. The best-selling pharmaceutical products from 2002 to 2004 (with number of pat-
ents in parentheses) were Lipitor (five), Zocor (one), Plavix (five), Advair (five), Norvasc
(two), Zyprexa (four), Paxil (seven), Nexium (thirteen), Zoloft (five), Celebrex (four), Effexor
(one), Prevacid (eight), Diovan (three), Fosamax (eleven), and Risperdal (three). See Krishan
Maggon, Editorial, Best-Selling Human Medicines 2002-2004, 10 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY
739, 740 (2005). Also note that five patents per drug is lower than the "astounding 10 patents
per drug" claimed by the President of the Generic Pharmaceutical Association. Generic
Pharmaceuticals: Marketplace Access and Consumer Issues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 107th Cong. 58 (2002) (statement of Kathleen Jaeger, President
and CEO, Generic Pharmaceutical Association).
102. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 6, at 1.
103. The coefficients in Table 2 are based on a negative binomial regression rather than
a linear fit because the dependent variable is a nonnegative count variable.
104. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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increase may also reflect changing standards for the granting of patents
at the USPTO."os
FIGURE 3
AVERAGE NUMBER OF PATENTS LISTED IN THE FDA ORANGE BOOK
















The average number of patents also varies across therapeutic class.
As seen in Table 1, the classes with the most patents are antihistamines
(4.13) and antineoplastic agents (4.23),' while the classes with the few-
est patents are drugs for electrolytic, caloric, and water balance (2.20)
and skin and mucous membrane agents (1.79).o' The fourth column of
Table 2 controls for therapeutic class; this does not significantly affect
the coefficients discussed above.
105. Cf ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To
Do ABOUT IT 11 (2004) (arguing that the redesign of the USPTO in the early 1990s led to "a
widely perceived decline in the rigor with which the standards of novelty and non-
obviousness are applied in reviewing patent applications").
106. Antineoplastic agents are cancer drugs, such as Gleevec.
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C. Results: Public-Sector Patent Holders and Follow-On Patents
As discussed in Part II, universities and other public-sector institu-
tions hold many drug patents. The existence of follow-on patents on a
drug has important implications for the socially responsible licensing
goals of many of these institutions.
The bottom half of Table I shows the breakdown of patents by type
of assignee. Of the 1946 unique patents in the dataset, 108 have only
public-sector assignees. Another 14 of the 1946 patents have mixed pri-
vate and public ownership, and private-sector assignees own the
remainder. The 108 pure public-sector patents cover 77 different drugs;
the 14 mixed-ownership patents cover 13. Two drugs have both a pure
public-sector patent and a mixed-ownership patent, so the total number
of drugs with any public-sector patent assignee is 88.
These 88 drugs are given in Table 3, which lists the 34 drugs that
have only public-sector assignees on all of their patents, and in Table 4,
which lists the 54 drugs with mixed ownership either on the same patent
or on different patents.as In addition to listing the identity of the public-
sector assignees and the year of approval, these tables also indicate
which drugs are NCEs or received priority approval, as well as which
drugs received a patent term extension and whether the extension was
given to a public- or private-sector patent. Some of these drugs will be
discussed in more detail in Part IV.
Table 5 examines the impact of ptblic-sector patents on the number
of patents on a drug. The first two columns show that having a public-
sector assignee on at least one patent causes a very small and statistically
insignificant increase in the total number of patents. However, when fo-
cusing only on whether there is more than one patent on a drug (rather
than the total number of follow-on patents), the middle two columns
show that there is a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of a
follow-on patent when there is at least one public-sector assignee.
The relevant question for proponents of socially responsible licens-
ing, however, is whether there is a private-sector follow-on patent. If
there is simply a second public-sector patent, then that public-sector en-
tity could follow the same access-promoting patenting strategy for both
patents. The last two columns in Table 5 address this question and show
that there is a decrease in the likelihood of a private-sector follow-on
when there is a public-sector assignee. When controls for drug type and
approval year are added, this decrease is statistically significant at the ten
percent level.
108. This list is similar to that given in Sampat, supra note 49, at 13 tbl. .
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Table 6 repeats the analyses of Table 5, but, in addition to looking at
whether a drug has any public-sector patent assignees, it also separates
the effects of mixed-ownership patents from those with only public-
sector assignees. Having a pure public-sector patent has no statistically
significant effect on the total number of patents on a drug, but it in-
creases the likelihood of having at least one follow-on patent and
decreases the likelihood of having a private-sector follow-on patent.
Having a mixed-ownership patent, on the other hand, is correlated with a
statistically significant increase in the total number of patents, as well as
a large increase in the likelihood of having a follow-on patent. The latter
is only significant at the ten percent level, probably due to the small
number of mixed-ownership patents.
Finally, Table 7 examines in more detail the impact of public-sector
patents on whether there is a private follow-on patent. As seen the last
column of Table 5, having a public-sector patent is correlated with a de-
creased likelihood of a private follow-on patent. This decrease becomes
larger and more highly significant if we focus on public-sector patents
that received a patent term extension (columns two and three) or public-
sector patents that were the first-issued patent on a drug (columns five
and six), which are those patents that are more likely to be the most im-
portant patents on a drug.
As a simpler way to think about this issue, without the additional
controls of a regression: of the 850 drugs with no public-sector assign-
ees, 562 (66%) have a follow-on patent. Of the 88 drugs with any public-
sector assignees, 71 (81%) have a follow-on patent, but only 53 (60%)
have a private-sector follow-on patent. In other words, university drugs
are more likely to have follow-on patents than drugs without university
patents. Because many of these follow-on patents are other public-sector
patents, however, university drugs actually are less likely to have private-
sector follow-on patents.
Even if university drugs are less likely to have a private-sector fol-
low-on patent, over half of them still do. Organizations like UAEM are
therefore right to worry that simply not filing public-sector patents in
low- and middle-income countries will be insufficient to ensure generic
access to public-sector drugs in those countries. The following Part looks
in more detail at public-sector patent contributions to FDA-approved
drugs.
109. The increase is significant at the five percent level without controls; the decrease is
significant at the ten percent level without controls and at the five percent level with controls.
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IV. CASE STUDIES IN PUBLIC-SECTOR PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTING
As examined in Part III, drugs with patents from universities and
other public-sector institutions are less likely to have additional private-
sector patents than drugs with only private-sector patent assignees.
Nonetheless, over half of public-sector drugs still have private-sector
follow-on patents, which could act as a barrier to making these drugs
accessible in low- and middle-income countries.
To examine this problem more closely, Table 8 lists detailed patent
information for the eighteen drugs with both public- and private-sector
patents that received FDA approval from 2001 through 2005, the most
recent years in the dataset. This table lists all patents that have been pub-
lished in the Orange Book for each drug; all assignees for those patents;
the patents' filing, issue, and expiration years; and a brief description of
the patent. For example, the first drug in Table 8, Alimta, is an NCE that
received priority approval for treating lung cancer. Princeton University
filed a patent on the drug molecule in 1991, which was granted in
1994."o Eli Lilly then filed a patent on using that molecule to treat tu-
mors in 1992, which was granted in 1993."' Princeton licensed its patent
to Eli Lilly in exchange for a percentage of net sales." 2 When Eli Lilly
obtained FDA approval for Alimta, it extended Princeton's patent, which
now expires in 2016. Eli Lilly was then issued an additional method-of-
treatment patent in 2010, which expires in 202 1."
In addition to the assignees, two characteristics of the patenting pat-
terns themselves are noteworthy. First, several of the drugs are not
covered by any patent on the drug molecule itself. For example, although
the Alzheimer's drug Namenda is an NCE, it is covered only by two
method-of-treatment patents." 4 Similarly, the new formulation Zerit XR
is covered by Yale's method-of-treatment patent and a patent on sus-
tained-release beadlets owned by Bristol-Myers Squibb."'5 Second, many
of the additional patents on these drugs are continuations, continuations-
in-part, or divisions of earlier patents on the same drug. Since these
"child" patents have the same expiration date as the parent, they will not
have the effect of "evergreening" the drug's patent protection. For exam-
110. U.S. Patent No. 5,344,932 (filed Mar. 22, 1991).
Ill. U.S. Patent No. 5,217,974 (filed Sept. 4, 1992).
112. See Goldie Blumenstyk, Princeton Claims Patent Infringement on a Blockbuster
Lung-Cancer Drug, CHRON, HIGHER EDUC. (May 6, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/
Princeton-Claims-Patent/42860.
113. U.S. Patent No. 7,772,209 (filed July 11, 2007).
114. U.S. Patent No. 5,614,560 (filed Apr. 11, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,061,703 (filed
Apr. I1, 1990).
115. See supra notes 94 and 96 and accompanying text.
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pie, as seen in Table 8, Velcade has eight patents listed in the Orange
Book, but they stem from only two patent families."'6
Turning to the patent assignees, it is noteworthy that public-sector
patents were extended under 35 U.S.C. § 156 for six of the eighteen
drugs in Table 8 and were the first-issued or first-filed patents for ten. In
these situations, where the public-sector institution has an early or im-
portant patent, it is more likely to have stronger bargaining power to
negotiate a proactive licensing agreement that ensures generic access in
low- and middle-income countries. Conversely, for a drug like Gleevec,
where the public-sector patent holders are joint patent owners with a
pharmaceutical company, and where that patent was filed late in the
FDA-approval process, those public-sector institutions probably have
less bargaining power.
CONCLUSION
This Note has presented the first extensive empirical analysis of fol-
low-on drug patents. The number of patents per drug has increased over
time, from around 2.5 in the late 1980s to nearly 3.5 by 2005. NCEs tend
to have fewer patents, while drugs that received priority approval or that
are covered by an extended patent tend to have more. Blockbuster drugs
tend to have the highest numbers of patents, with an average of over five
per drug from 2002 to 2004. These increasing numbers of patents may
be related to relaxed patentability standards at the USPTO or to more
aggressive patenting strategies on the part of pharmaceutical companies.
A more detailed look at drugs with patents owned by universities
and other public-sector entities revealed that while university drugs tend
to have more patents, they actually have fewer private-sector follow-on
patents, especially when the university patent received a patent term ex-
tension or was the first-issued patent on a drug. Still, sixty percent of
public-sector drugs do have private-sector patents. Therefore, policies
focused on increasing access to university medicines by simply not pat-
enting in low- and middle-income countries may be insufficient to
ensure generic access to these drugs. Instead, public-sector institutions
will need proactive licensing terms to ensure that follow-on patents do
not block access to the end products that are needed by patients.
The number of universities and other public-sector institutions that
follow socially responsible licensing practices is small but growing, and
a number of universities recently committed to implementing and meas-
uring the success of more specific strategies under the Statement of
116. ORANGE BOOK, supra note 29 (search by application number for "21602").
117. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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Principles and Strategies."" Other universities should join this effort or
adopt their own socially responsible licensing policies, both to further
the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act and to promote global health through
their role as public-spirited, knowledge-promoting institutions.
The results in this Note, however, indicate that some of the strategies
in the Statement of Principles and Strategies may be insufficient to pre-
vent patents from blocking access to medicines and other health-related
technologies in developing countries. In particular, it seems unlikely that
universities could ever "fully preclude intellectual property barriers to
generic provision by not patenting in developing countries, or by filing
and abandoning patents,"" 9 because even if the public-sector patents are
not a barrier, private-sector follow-on patents could be. Universities and
other public-sector institutions should instead focus on other strategies
from the Statement of Principles and Strategies that would prevent their
private-sector partners from using follow-on patents to block access,
such as "[r]eserved or 'march-in' rights, mandatory sublicenses or non-
assert provisions." 20 Universities that develop their own socially respon-
sible licensing policies, as well as those that choose to join and help
revise the Statement of Principles and Strategies,121 should emphasize the
benefits of these and other proactive licensing strategies in promoting
access to their inventions.
118. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
119. ASS'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 2.
120. Id. at 3.
121. Signatories have committed to "[rievisit these principles on a biennial basis," and
the next revision should be released in the fall of 2011. Id. at 4. Discussions about these revi-
sions are therefore likely to begin soon.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF DRUG AND PATENT DATA
FDA-Approved Drugs (1988-2005) Number Avg. Patents (Std. Dev.)
All drugs 938 2.97 (2.55)
New Chemical Entities (NCEs) 380 2.88 (2.41)
Priority approval 228 3.41 (2.87)
Received patent term extension 453 3.10 (2.62)
Therapeutic class
Antihistamines 16 4.13 (2.96)
Anti-infective agents 123 3.45 (2.45)
Antineoplastic agents 57 4.23 (4.21)
Autonomic drugs 58 2.91 (2.42)
Blood formation and coagulation 13 2.92 (2.69)
Cardiovascular agents 100 2.89 (2.41)
Central nervous system agents 125 2.72 (2.32)
Diagnostic agents 31 2.84 (2.28)
Electrolytic, caloric, and water balance 10 2.20 (1.32)
Eye, ear, nose, and throat 50 2.62 (1.86)
Gastrointestinal drugs 55 3.11 (2.69)
Hormones and synthetic substitutes 93 3.10 (2.92)
Skin and mucous membrane agents 71 1.79 (1.34)
Smooth muscle relaxants 6 4.00 (3.79)
Vitamins 6 3.83 (2.48)
Other classes 124 2.80 (2.15)
Patent ownership
Only public-sector assignees on all patents 34 2.03 (1.34)
Mixed public/private ownership 54 3.96 (2.48)
Only private-sector assignees on all patents 850 2.95 (2.58)
Patents in Orange Book Number Number of Drugs
All patents (counting twice if on two drugs) 2788 938
Unique patents (counting once if on two drugs) 1946 938
Only private-sector assignees 1824 902
Only public-sector assignees 108 77
U.S. universities 52 39
U.S. institutes 25 16
U.S.government 15 15
Foreign public-sector 16 8
Mixed public/private sector on same patent 14 13
Notes: "Number of Drugs" at bottom right refers to drugs with at least one patent of that type, not
drugs with only patents of that type.
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TABLE 2
NUMBER OF PATENTS ON FDA-APPROVED DRUGS (1988-2005)
Dependent Variable: Number of Patents
NCE -0.170*** -0.156* -0.156**
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Priority approval 0.238*" 0.250** 0.209*
(0.065) (0.065) (0.070)
Extended patent 0.121" 0.140" 0.121*
(0.062) (0.062) (0.060)
Approval year 0.024*** 0.025* 0.023**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Therapeutic class No No No Yesfixed effects
Notes: The dependent variable in each negative binomial regression is the number of patents that
have been listed in the FDA's Orange Book for each drug.
Independent variables (listed in separate rows) are (1) whether the drug is a new chemical entity
(NCE), (2) whether the drug received priority FDA approval, (3) whether any of the drug's patents
were extended under 35 U.S.C. § 156, (4) the FDA approval year for the drug, and (5) controls for
the therapeutic class of the drug.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the *1%,
**5%, and *10% levels. N = 938 for all columns.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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TABLE 3
DRUGS WITH ONLY PUBLIC-SECTOR PATENT ASSIGNEES
NDA Tradename Year Patents Patent Assignee(s)
20162 Acthrel' 1996 1 Salk Institute
20747 Actiq 1998 2 University of Utah
19937 Adenocard' 1989 1 University of Virginia
20404 Avita 1997 2 University of California
20954 Busulfe9 1999 2 University of Houston; University of Texas
21673 Clolar' 2004 2' Southern Research Institute
18511 DTPA 1989 1 U.S. Government, DOE
20193 Elmiron" 1996 1 University of California
21500 Emtriva" 2003 5' Emory University
21896 Emtriva' 2005 5- Emory University
19677 Enlon-Plus 1991 1 University of California
20044 Exosurf Neonatal 1990 3- University of California
20038 Fludara' 1991 1' U.S. Government, HHS
19863 Geref' 1990 2' Salk Institute
20443 Geref 1997 2- Salk Institute
20845 Inomax 1999 2 Mass. General Hospital
20388 Navelbine' 1994 1. French Government
21544 Seasonale 2003 1 Medical College of Hampton Roads
21084 SERPACWAm 2000 1 U.S. Government, Army
19890 Stadol 1991 1 University of Kentucky
19836 Supprelin' 1991 1 Salk Institute
20898 Thyrogen' 1998 2 Sloan-Kettering
21248 Trisenox' 2000 4 Sloan-Kettering
19981 Ultratag 1991 1 Associated Universities
20155 VidexP 1991 3 U.S. Government, HHS
20156 Videe 1991 3 U.S. Government, HHS
21183 Videx ECP 2000 2 U.S. Government, HHS
20638 Vistide' 1996 1. Czech Academy of Sciences
20569 Vitrasertf 1996 1 University of Kentucky
21636 Zegerid 2004 5 University of Missouri
21706 Zegerid 2004 5 University of Missouri
21606 Zemplar 2005 2' University of Wisconsin
20412 Zerit' 1994 1. Yale University
20413 Zerit 1996 1' Yale University
Notes: List of all thirty-four drugs approved 1988-2005 with only public-sector patent assignees.
NDA = new drug application number; n = new chemical entity (NCE); '= priority approval; Year =
FDA approval year; Patents = number of patents in Orange Book 0= patent extended under 35
U.S.C. § 156 (not necessarily as part of this NDA); HHS = Department of Health and Human
Services; DOE = Department of Energy.
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TABLE 4
DRUGS WITH PUBLIC- AND PRIVATE-SECTOR PATENTS
NDA Tradename Year Patents Public-Sector Assignee(s)
21462 Alimta' 2004 2 (1') Princeton University
20625 Allegra" 1996 12'(1) Georgetown University
20786 Allegra-D 12 Hour 1997 11' (1) Georgetown University
21316 Altoprev 2002 3(1) Children's Hospital Boston
19785 Cardiolite" 1990 5 (1') Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
Harvard College
21392 Cardizem LA 2003 4(1) University of Gent
19829 Ceretec' 1988 2 (1) University of Missouri
21197 Cetrotide" 2000 4 (1') Tulane University
21835 Clobex 2005 2 (1) University of Tennessee
20869 Cosopt 1998 4' (1) University of Florida
21283 Diovan 2001 3(1) Brigham & Women's Hospital
20221 Ethyol 1995 4 (1) University of Arizona
20989 Evoxace 2000 2 (1") Israeli Government
20195 Fentany' 1993 2 (1) University of Utah
21481 Fuzeon' 2003 3 (2') Duke University
21335 Gleevec' 2001 3' (1) Oregon Health & Science University;
Dana Farber Cancer Institute
21588 Gleevec 2003 3 (1) Oregon Health & Science University;
Dana Farber Cancer Institute
20637 Gliadel' 1996 3 (2) Massachusetts Institute of Technology
20076 Habitrol 1991 3(2) University of California
21449 Hepsera' 2002 2 (1) Czech Academy of Sciences
20199 Hivid 1992 2 (1) U.S. Government, HHS
20965 Levulan" 1999 5 (4Q) Queens University of Kingston
21446 Lyrica' 2004 3 (2) Northwestern University
21674 Menostar 2004 3(2) University of California; Kaiser Foundation
20586 Meretek UBT Kit 1996 2' (1) Balyor College of Medicine
20098 Mivacron 1992 1' (1) Mass. General Hospital
21487 Namendan 2003 2(1) Children's Hospital Boston
20326 Neutrexin' 1993 3' (1) U.S. Government, HHS
19927 Nizoral 1990 2(1) University of Tennessee
20310 Nizoral A-D 1997 2(1) University of Tennessee
20886 Panretin' 1999 2 (2) Balyor College of Medicine; Salk Institute
20958 Pepcid Complete 2000 3 (1) Brigham & Women's Hospital
21320 Plenaxis' 2003 6 (3) Indiana University
21688 Sensipar"f 2004 4 (2) Brigham & Women's Hospital
19608 Sildaflo 1989 2 (1) Research Corporation
21106 Somavert7 2003 6' (4) Ohio University
20657 Sporanox' 1997 5* (1) U.S. Government, HHS
21055 Targretin" 1999 5 (1') La Jolla Cancer Research Foundation
20262 Taxol" 1992 3 (1') U.S. Government, HHS
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NDA Tradename Year Patents Public-Sector Assignee(s)
20785 Thalomid' 1998 10 (2) Children's Hospital Boston
19979 Ticlid" 1991 2(1) French Government
20505 Topamax" 1996 4' (3) New England Medical Center
20844 Topamax Sprinkle 1998 5' (3) New England Medical Center
20408 Trusopt" 1994 2' (1') University of Florida
21752 Truvadap 2004 9 (5') Emory University
21602 Velcade" 2003 6' (2) U.S. Government, HHS
21267 Vfend 2002 7' (2) University of Kansas
20154 VidexP 1991 4 (3) U.S. Government, HHS
21119 Visudyne" 2000 10 (7') Massachusetts General Hospital;
University of British Columbia
20961 Vitravene9 1998 4 (2) U.S. Government, HHS
20597 Xalatan' 1996 5 (1") Columbia University
20819 Zemplar" 1998 4 (20) University of Wisconsin
21453 Zerit XR 2002 2 (1') Yale University
20212 Zinecard' 1995 2(1) New York University
Notes: Table lists all fifty-four drugs approved 1988-2005 with both private- and public-sector
patent assignees among all listed patents. NDA = new drug application number; "= new chemical
entity (NCE); P= priority approval; Year = FDA approval year; Patents = total number of patents in
Orange Book (with number of public-sector patents in parentheses); = patent covering drug was
extended under 35 U.S.C. § 156 (outside parentheses = private-sector patent; inside parentheses
= public-sector patent); '= public-sector patent is first issued patent for this drug; HHS=
Department of Health and Human Services; DOE = Department of Energy.
Fall 2010]1 327
328 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 17:299
TABLE 5
IMPACT OF PUBLIC-SECTOR PATENTS ON FOLLOW-ON PATENTS
Dependent Variable:
Number of Follow-On Private Follow-On
Patents] (Dummy) (Dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public-sector 0.087 0.009 0.761*" 0.612* -0.254 -0.461*
assignee (0.082) (0.085) (0.280) (0.300) (0.230) (0.259)
NCE -0.157" -0.326* -0.235
(0.063) (0.175) (0.172)
Priority approval 0.208** 0.584- 0.519"
(0.072) (0.211) (0.204)
Extended patent 0.121" 0.357** 0.329*
(0.060) (0.163) (0.159)
Approval year 0.023** 0.059** 0.051**"
(0.006) (0.016) (0.016)
Therapeutic No Yes No Yes No Yes
class fixed
effects
Notes: The dependent variable for the negative binomial regressions in the first two columns is the
number of patents that have been listed in the FDA's Orange Book for each drug. The dependent
variables for the logistic regressions in the last four columns are dummy variables for whether the
drug has more than one patent in the Orange Book for the last two columns, at least one of these
patents must be a private-sector patent.
Independent variables (listed in separate rows) are (1) whether the drug has any public-sector
patent assignee, (2) whether the drug is a new chemical entity (NCE), (3) whether the drug
received priority FDA approval, (4) whether any of the drug's patents were extended under 35
U.S.C. § 156, (5) the FDA approval year for the drug, and (6) controls for the therapeutic class of
the drug.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the **1 %,
**5%, and *10% levels. N = 938 for all columns.
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TABLE 6
IMPACT OF PURE PUBLIC-SECTOR OR MIXED PATENTS
ON FOLLOW-ON PATENTS
Dependent Variable:
Number of Follow-On Private Follow-On
Patents [ (Dummy) (Dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pure public- 0.008 -0.077 0.644- 0.475 -0.468* -0.706"
sector patent (0.078) (0.081) (0.291) (0.312) (0.242) (0.276)
Public/private 0.497** 0.485* 1.738* 1.753 1.903* 1.918*
mixed patent (0.204) (0.216) (1.042) (1.098) (1.056) (1.105)
NCE .0.163*" -0.333* -0.251
(0.062) (0.175) (0.172)
Priority approval 0.200** 0.564* 0.482*
(0.072) (0.211) (0.205)
Extended patent 0.120* 0.357" 0.330**
(0.060) (0.163) (0.160)
Approval year 0.023*** 0.057** 0.047***
(0.006) (0.016) (0.016)
Therapeutic No Yes No Yes No Yes
class fixed
effects
Notes: The dependent variable for the negative binomial regressions in the first two columns is the
number of patents that have been listed in the FDA's Orange Book for each drug. The dependent
variables for the logistic regressions in the last four columns are dummy variables for whether the
drug has more than one patent in the Orange Book- for the last two columns, at least one of these
patents must be a private-sector patent.
Independent variables (listed in separate rows) are (1) whether the drug has a patent assigned to
only private-sector entities, (2) whether the drug has a mixed-ownership patent (assigned to both
public- and private-sector entities), (3) whether the drug is a new chemical entity (NCE), (4)
whether the drug received priority FDA approval, (5) whether any of the drug's patents were
extended under 35 U.S.C. § 156, (6) the FDA approval year for the drug, and (7) controls for the
therapeutic class of the drug.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the ***1%,
**5%, and *10% levels. N = 938 for all columns.
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TABLE 7
IMPACT OF IMPORTANT PUBLIC-SECTOR PATENTS ON PRIVATE
FOLLOW-ON PATENTS
Dependent Variable: Private Follow-On (Dummy)
Public-sector patent -0.461*
(0.259)
Public-sector patent -0.665* -1.179**
extended (0.385) (0.475)
Public-sector patent -0.863"* -1.161*
issued first (0.259) (0.312)
NCE -0.235 -0.232 -0.216
(0.172) (0.172) (0.173)
Priority approval 0.519" 0.511" 0.633.*
(0.204) (0.204) (0.212)
Extended patent 0.329** 0.416*" 0.305*
(0.159) (0.160) (0.160)
Approval year 0.051"* 0.053*** 0.050"*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Therapeutic class fixed Yes No Yes No Yes
effects
Notes: The dependent variable for each logistic regression is a dummy variable for whether the
drug has more than one patent in the Orange Book with at least one private-sector patent.
Independent variables (listed in separate rows) are (1) whether the drug has any public-sector
patent assignee, (2) whether the drug received a patent term extension on a public-sector patent,
(3) whether the drug's first issued patent was a public-sector patent, (4) whether the drug is a new
chemical entity (NCE), (5) whether the drug received priority FDA approval, (6) whether any of the
drug's patents were extended under 35 U.S.C. § 156, (7) the FDA approval year for the drug, and
(8) controls for the therapeutic class of the drug.
The first column is identical to the last column in Table 5, and is included for ease of comparison.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the ***%,
**5%, and *10% levels. N = 938 for all columns.
(4)(1) (2) (3) (5)
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TABLE 8
DETAILED PATENT INFORMATION FOR THE 18 DRUGS WITH
PUBLIC- AND PRIVATE- SECTOR PATENTS THAT RECEIVED
FDA APPROVAL FROM 2001-05
Alimta (Pemetrexed Disodium NCE, Priority Approval
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21462 Eli Lilly 2004 lung cancer (antineoplastic)
Patent Assignee FileIssue/Exp. Description
5217974 Eli Lilly 1992/1993/2011 method of treatment
5344932' Princeton Univ. 1991/1994/2016 NCE
7772209' Eli Lilly 2007/2010/2021 method of treatment
Altoprev (lovastatin)-new formulation
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21316 Andrx Labs. 2002 cholesterol (cardiovascular)
Patent Patent Assignee Filellssue/Exp. Description
5916595 Andrx Pharms. 1997/1999/2017 controlled-release formulation
6080778 Children's Hosp. Boston 1998/2000/2018 method of treatment
6485748 Andrx Pharms. 1997/2002/2017 controlled-release formulation
(continuation of '595)
Cardizem LA (diltiazem hydrochloride -new formulation
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21392 Biovail Labs. Int'l 2003 hypertension (cardiovascular)
Patent Assignee File/Issue/Exp. Description
5288505 Galephar P.R. 1991/1994/2011 extended-release formulation
5529791 Galephar PR. 1994/1996/2013 extended-release formulation
(continuation of '505)
6923984 Univ. of Gent 200012005/2021 wax beads for holding biologically
active ingredients
7108866 Biovall Labs. Int'l 2000/2005/2019 controlled-release formulation;
method of treatment
Clobex (clobetasol)-new formulation
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21835 Galderma Labs 2005 psoriasis (skin & mucus membrane)
Patent Assignee File/IssuelExp. Description
5972920 Dermalogix Partners 1998/1999/2018 new formulation
5990100 Univ. of Tenn.; Panda 1998/1999/2018 composition; method of treatment
Pharms.
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Diovan (valsartan)-new formulation
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21283 Novartis 2001 hypertension (cardiovascular)
Patent Assignee Filefissue/Exp. Description
5399578 Ciba-Geigy 1992/1995/2012 NCE; method of treatment
5972990 Brigham & Women's Hosp. 1992/1999/2016 method of treatment
6294197 Novartis 1999/2001/2017 oral dosage form
Fuzeon (enfuvirtide)-NCE, priority approval
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21481 Roche 2003 HIV (anti-infective)
Patent Assignee File/Issue/Exp. Description
5464933 Duke Univ. 1993/1995/2013 NCE
6133418' Duke Univ. 1995/2000/2014 NCE (child of'933)
6475491 Trimeris 1998/2002/2015 method of treatment; composition
Gleevec (imatinib mesylate)-NCE (priority approval) and new formulation
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21335 Novartis 2001 cancer (antineoplastic)
21588 Novartis 2003 cancer (antineoplastic)
Patent Assignee File/Issue/Exp. Description
5521184' Ciba-Geigy 1994/1996/2015 NCE; method of treatment
6894051 Novartis 1998/2005/2019 crystalline form; method of treatment
6958335 Oregon Health & Sci. 2001/2005/2021 method of treatment
Univ.; Dana-Farber Cancer
Inst.; Novartis
7544799n Novartis 2006/2009/2019 crystalline form (child of '051)
Hepsera (adefovir dipivoxil)-NCE, priority approval
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21449 Gilead 2002 hepatitis B (anti-infective)
Patent Assignee File/Issue/Exp. Description
5663159 Czech Acad. of Scis.; 1994/1997/2014 NCE; method of treatment
Rega Stichting v.z.w.
6451340 Gilead 2001/2002/2018 crystalline form; method of treatment
Lyrica (pregabalin)-NCE, priority approval
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21446 CP Pharms. 2004 nerve pain (central nervous system)
Patent Assignee File/IssuelExp. Description
5563175 Northwestern Univ.; 1995/1996/2013 method of treatment
Warner-Lambert
6001876 Warner-Lambert 1998/1999/2018 method of treatment
6197819 Northwestern Univ. 1995/2001/2018 NCE (same family as '175)
The '876 patent was extended under Lyrica NDA No. 21723.
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Menostar (estradiol)-new indication
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21674 Bayer 2004 osteoporosis prevention (hormones
& synthetic substitutes)
Patent Assignee Filelssue/Exp. Description
5223261 Riker Labs. 1991/1993/2010 patch for delivering drug through
skin; method of treatment
5891868 Univ. of Cal.; Kaiser 1997/1999/2017 method of treatment
Found.; Berlex Labs.;
Permanente Med. Grp.
6692763 Univ. of Cal.; Kaiser 2000/2004/2017 method of treatment (very similar
Found.; Berlex Labs.; claims to '868)
Permanente Med. Grp.
Namenda (memantine hydrochloride)-NCE
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21487 Forest Labs 2003 Alzheimer's (central nervous
system)
Patent Assignee File/Issue/Exp. Description
5061703" Merz GmbH & Co. 1990/1991/2015 method of treatment
5614560 Children's Hospital 1995/1997/2014 method of treatment
Boston _ _
*Extended after the data on patent term extensions was obtained from the USPTO website.
**No longer listed in the Orange Book.
Plenaxis (abarelixy-NCE, priority approval
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21320 Speciality European 2003 prostate cancer (antineoplastic)
Patent Assignee File/IssuelExp. Description
5843901' Advanced Research & 1995/1998/2015 NCE
Tech. Inst. (Indiana Univ.)
5968895 Praecis Pharms. 1996/1999/2016 composition
6180608 Praecis Pharms. 1997/2001/2016 formulation; method of treatment
(child of '895)
6423686 Advanced Research & 1998/2002/2015 NCE (child of '901)
Tech. Inst. (Indiana Univ.)
6455499 Indiana Univ. 1999/2002/2015 method of treatment (child of '686)
6699833 Praecis Pharms. 1999/2004/2016 composition (child of '895)
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Sensipar (cinacalcet hydrochloride)-NCE, priority approval
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21688 Amgen 2004 secondary hyperparathyroidism,
hypercalcaemia (other)
Patent Assignee File/IssuelExp. Description
6011068 Brigham & Women's 1994/2000/2016 NCE
Hosp.; NPS Pharms.
6031003 Brigham & Women's 1995/2000/2016 method of treatment (child of
Hosp.; NPS Pharms. '068)
6211244 NPS Pharms. 1995/2001/2015 NCE; method of treatment
6313146 NPS Pharms. 1995/2001/2016 NCE (child of '068)
Somavert (pegvisomant)-NCE, priorit, approval
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21106 Pharmacia and Upjohn 2003 acromegaly (hormones & synthetic
substitutes)
Patent Assignee File/Issue/Exp. Description
5350836 Ohio Univ. 1992/1994/2011 NCE
5681809 Ohio Univ. 1994/1997/2011 NCE; method of treatment (child of
'836)
5849535' Genentech 1996/1998/2017 NCE; method of preparation
5958879 Ohio Univ. 1995/1999/2011 NCE; method of treatment (child of
'809)
6057292 Genentech 1998/2000/2015 method of treatment (child of '535)
6583115 Ohio Univ. 1995/2003/2011 NCE; method of treatment (child of
1 .'809)
Truvada (emtricitabine; tenofovir disoproxil fumarate}-new comb., priority
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21752 Gilead 2004 HIV (anti-infective)
Patent Assignee File/Issue/Exp. Description
5210085 Emory Univ. 1991/1993/2010 method of treatment
5814639 Emory Univ. 1993/1998/2015 NCE (child of '085)
5914331e Emory Univ. 1995/1999/2017 NCE (child of '085)
5922695 Gilead 1997/1999/2017 NCE; method of treatment; method
of preparation
5935946 Gilead 1997/1999/2017 NCE; method of treatment; method
of preparation
5977089 Gilead 1998/1999/2017 NCE; method of treatment (child of
'695)
6043230 Gilead 1999/2000/2017 method of preparation (child of '695)
6642245 Emory Univ. 1995/2003/2020 method of treatment (child of '085)
6703396 Emory Univ. 1995/2004/2021 NCE (child of '085)
7402588" Emory Univ. 2006/2008/2010 method of treatment; composition
(child of '085)
*Extended for the drug Emtriva (NDA 21500), one of the components in Truvada.
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Velcade (bortezomib)-NCE, priority approval
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21602 Millennium Pharms. 2003 multiple myeloma, mantle cell
lymphoma (antineoplastic)
Patent Assignee File/Issue/Exp. Description
5780454' ProScript 1995/1998/2017 NCE
6083903 LeukoSite 1995/2000/2014 NCE; method of treatment (same
family as '454)
6297217 Millennium Pharms. 2000/2001/2014 method of treatment (division of
'454)
6617317 Millennium Pharms. 2002/2003/2013 NCE (child of '217)
6713446 U.S. Gov't, HHS 2002/2004/2022 NCE; method of preparation
6747150" Millennium Pharms. 2003/2004/2014 NCE (child of '317)
6958319 U.S. Gov't, HHS 2003/2005/2022 NCE; method of preparation (child of
1 '446)
7119080" Millennium Pharms. 2003/2006/2014 NCE (child of '317)
Vfend (voriconazole)-new formulation
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21267 Pfizer 2002 fungal infections (anti-infective)
Patent Assignee File/Issue/Exp. Description
5116844 Pfizer 1989/1992/2009 composition for treatment; method of
treatment
5134127 Univ. of Kansas 1990/199212010 NCE
5364938 Pfizer 1993/1994/2011 NCE (child of '844)
5376645 Univ. of Kansas 1992/1994/2010 NCE (child of '127)
5567817' Pfizer 1995/1996/2016 NCE; method of treatment
5773443 Pfizer 1996/1998/2011 NCE; method of treatment (child of
'817)
6632803 Pfizer 1999/2003/2018 formulation
Zerit XR (stavudine)-new formulation
NDA FDA Applicant Approval Indication (Therap. Grp.)
21453 Bristol-Myers Squibb 2002 HIV (anti-infective)
Patent Assignee File/Issue/Exp. Description
4978655" Yale Univ. 1986/1990/2008 method of treatment
7135465 Bristol-Myers Squibb 2001/2006/2023 sustained release beadlets
*Extended for the drug Zerit (NDA 20412).
Notes: Each sub-table gives the proprietary trade name of the FDA-approved drug (with the active
ingredient in parentheses), the new drug application (NDA) number for the drug, the company that
applied for FDA approval, the year of FDA approval, the conditions for which the drug is indicated
(with the therapeutic group in parentheses). The second part of each sub-table lists all patents that
have been listed in the Orange Book for that drug; all assignees for those patents; the filing, issue,
and expiration years; and a brief description of the patent. The superscript ' indicates that a patent
was extended under 35 U.S.C. § 156 (though the extension may have been granted as part of an
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earlier NDA, as for Zerit XR). The superscript ' indicates that a patent was newly added to the
Orange Book after the creation of the dataset used for the analyses in Tables 1 through 7."Child"
patents are continuations, divisions, or continuations-in-part; patents in the same "family" are
children of the same patent.
